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Philosophische FakultätPhilosophisches Seminar

Publications



Monographs

  • Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press, 2010 hdk., 2012 pbk.
  • The Metaphysics of Memory. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008 hbk.
  • Reading Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006 hbk. & pbk.

Co-Edited Works

  • Kant and Contemporary Epistemology. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 25:1, 2022
  • The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
  • Medical Knowledge in a Social World. Synthese special issue Vol.196, 2019
  • Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. London: Routledge, 2017 hdk, 2019 pbk.
  • Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge, 2011 hbk., 2013 pbk.
  • Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 pbk.

Epistemology General

  • Bernecker, S. Justified Evidence Resistance. Acta Anal (2023). DOI: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-023-00575-y
  • Evidence, Reasons, and Knowledge in the Reasons-First Program. (with P. Silva). Philosophical Studies. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02044-z
  • Explanatory Salience Contextualism Revisited. Synthese (2023) 201:80. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04067-9
  • Knowledge, Falsehood, and Defeat. In R. Borges & I. Schnee (eds.),
    Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge (pp. 139-157). London 2023: Routledge
  • Knowledge from Falsehood and Truth-Closeness.   Philosophia 50 (2022), 1623-1638.
  • Evidence, Reasons, and Knowledge. Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. With P. Silva
  • Greco’s Explanatory Salience Contextualism Revisited. Synthese (2023) 201:80. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04067-9
  • Knowledge, Falsehood, and Defeat. Forthcoming in R. Borges & I. Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. London: Routledge
  • Knowledge from Falsehood and Truth-Closeness.  Philosophia (2022). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00479-y
  • Against Global Method Safety. Synthese. 197 (2020), 5101-5116
  • An Epistemic Defense of News Abstinence. In The Epistemology of Fake News, S. Bernecker, A. Flowerree & T. Grundmann (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. 
  • Extended Minds in Vats. In The Brain in a Vat, S.C. Goldberg (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 54-72.
  • On the Metaphysics of Knowledge. In The New Desire for Metaphysics, M. Gabriel, W. Hogrebe, and A. Speer (eds.), Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015, 161-180.
  • Die identifikationistische Lösung des Gettier Problems. In Erkenntnistheorie - wie und wozu?, D. Koppelberg and S. Tolksdorf (eds.), Münster: Mentis, 2015, 189-214.
  • How to Understand the Extended Mind. Philosophical Issues 24 (2014), 1-23.
  • Der Wert des Wissens. In Grundkurs Erkenntnistheorie, N. Kompa and S. Schmoranzer (eds.), Paderborn: Mentis, 2014, 109-119.
  • Triangular Externalism. In Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, E. Lepore and K. Ludwig (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, 443-455.
  • Warum das Gettier-Problem kein Scheinproblem ist. In Das Gettierproblem: Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren, G. Ernst and L. Marani (eds.), Paderborn: Mentis, 2013, 29-48.
  • Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure. Acta Analytica 27 (2012), 367-381.
  • Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011), 127-152.
  • Die Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung und der direkte Realismus. In Aktuelle Probleme der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung, R. Schantz (ed.), Frankfurt/M. 2009: Ontos, 155-181.
  • Weshalb Wissen keinen spezifischen Wert hat. In Wissen und Werte, G. Schönrich (ed.), Paderborn, Mentis, 2009, 73-94.
  • Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2008), 164-172.
  • Wider den Empirismus bezüglich Farbbegriffen. In Farben, J. Steinbrenner and S. Glasauer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2007: Suhrkamp, 248-273.
  • Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (2006), 81-104.
  • Rule-Following Made Easy. In Knowledge and Belief, W. Löffler and P. Weingartner (eds.), Vienna: öbv-hpt, 2004, 63-69.
  • Psychophysische Gesetze und Supervenienz. Philosophia Naturalis 40 (2003), 207-225.
  • Skeptizismus, Naturalismus und Quine. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 110 (2003), 46-58.
  • Radikale Interpretation und Skeptizismus. In Davidsons Philosophie des Mentalen, W.R. Köhler (ed.), Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997, 53-65.

Memory

  • Dreaming, Imagining, and Remembering. Forthcoming in D. Gregory & K. Michaelian (eds.), Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues. Berlin: Springer.
  • An Explanationist Model of (False) Memory. In A. Sant’Anna, C. McCarroll, K. Michaelian (eds.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory (pp. 109-126), London 2022: Routledge.
  • The Ethics of Remembering and Forgetting. Chinese Social Sciences Today Vol. 1996 (08/25/2020).       http://www.cssn.cn/kxk/kxyrw/202008/t20200825_5173772.shtml
  • Introduction to Review Symposium on the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, Memory Studies 12 (2019): 746 - 750 
  • Knowledge from Forgetting. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 98 (2019): 525 - 540. With T. Grundmann
  • On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting. In New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, K. Michaelian, D. Debus, and D. Perrin (eds.), London: Routledge (2018): 241-258.
  • A Causal Theory of Mnemonic Confabulation. Frontiers in Psychology 8: 1207 (2017): 1-14.
  • Memory and Truth. In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, E. Bernecker and K. Michaelian (eds.), Routledge: London, 2017, 51-62.
  • Visual Memory and the Bounds of Authenticity. In Mind, Language and Action, D. Moyal-Sharrock, V. Munz, and A. Coliva (eds.), Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015, 445-463.
  • Memory in Analytic Philosophy. In Memory: A History, D. Nikulin (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 298-315.
  • Memory Knowledge. In Routledge Companion to Epistemology, S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), London: Routledge, 2011, 326-334.
  • Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg. Philosophical Studies 153 (2011), 109-121.
  • Precis of Memory: A Philosophical Study. Philosophical Studies 153 (2011), 61-64.
  • Remembering without Knowing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2007), 137-156
  • Memory and Externalism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2004), 605-632.
  • Russell on Mnemic Causation. Principia 5 (2001), 149-185.
  • Impliziert Erinnerung Wissen?. In Erkenntnistheorie, T. Grundmann (ed.), Paderborn: Mentis, 2001, 145-164.

Kant and German Idealism

  • A Kantian Perspective on Robot Ethics. In D. Schönecker & H. Kim (eds), Kant and Artificial Intelligence (pp. 147-168), Berlin 2022: de Gruyter. With L. Benossi
  • Der indexikalische Fehlschluss. in McTaggarts Beweis der Irrealität der Zeit. Forthcoming in Raum und Zeit, V. Waibel (Ed.), Hamburg: Meiner.
  • Reinholds linguistischer Schematismus. Proceedings of the 12. International Kant Congress: Nature and Freedom, Vol. V, V. L. Waibel, M. Ruffing and D. Wagner (eds.), Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2018, pp. 3369-3377.
  • Kant on Spatial Orientation. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2012), 519-533.
  • Reinholds Erkenntnistheorie des Dissens. In Wille, Willkür, Freiheit: Reinholds Freiheitskonzeption im Kontext der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, V. Stolz, M. Bondeli and M. Heinz (eds.), Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012, 453-469.
  • Reinhold's Road to Fichte: The Elementary-Philosophy of 1795/96. In Karl Leonhard Reinhold and the Enlightenment, G. di Giovanni (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer, 201, 221-240.
  • Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten lesen. Information Philosophie 2009, vol. 2, 50-58.
  • Kant zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis. Kant-Studien 97 (2006), 163-183.
  • Review of D. Freundlieb, Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy (Ashgate 2003), Philosophical Review 115 (2006), 115-117.

Self Knowledge

  • Representationalism, First-Person Authority and Second-Order Knowledge. In Self-Knowledge, A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 33-52.
  • Self-Knowledge and the Bounds of Authenticity. Erkenntnis 71 (2009), 107-21.
  • Wissen zweiter Ordnung und Zombies. In Den eigenen Geist kennen, A. Newen and G. Vosgerau (eds.), Paderborn: Mentis, 2005, 119-134.
  • Believing that you Know and Knowing that you Believe. In The Externalist Challenge, R. Schantz (ed.), Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004, 369-376.
  • Knowing the World by Knowing One’s Mind. Synthese 123 (2000), 1-34.
  • Self-Knowledge and Closure. In Externalism and Self-Knowledge, P. Ludlow and N. Martin (eds.), Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1998, 333-349.
  • Die Grenzen des Selbstwissens. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 51 (1997), 216-230.
  • Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge. Noûs 30 (1996), 262-275.
  • Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism. Inquiry 39 (1996), 121-139.