Vorträge

2020
University of Edinburgh (TBD due to pandemic), Contemporary Kantian Epistemology.

2020
University of Warwick (TBD due to pandemic), On Knowledge and Belief.

2020
Technische Universität Dortmund (TBD due to pandemic), On Possessing Reasons.

2019
Return of the Kantians Conference, University of Cologne, Kantian Modal Epistemology.

2019
Goethe Universität Frankfurt, In Defense of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge.

2019
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, New Prospects for Skepticism: Beliefless Knowing.

2018
Swarthmore College, Belief, Credence, Mistuned Knowledge.

2018
The Society for Exact Philosophy, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.

2017
Washington University of Saint Louis, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.

2017
University of Cologne, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.

2017
University of Delaware, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.

2017
University of Connecticut, Social Epistemology Workshop, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.

2017
Syracuse University, The Creighton Club: The New York State Philosophical Association, Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief 

2017
College of William and Mary, A Conceptual Analysis of Glory.

2017
Swarthmore College, Beliefless Knowing.

2017
St. Joseph’s University, Beliefless Knowing.

2017
University of Notre Dame, Formal Epistemology Reading Group, Mistuned Knowledge (w/ Matt Lee).

2016
La Trobe University, Problems for Evidential Enkrasia are No Problem for Normative Enkrasia.

2016
Monash University, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Some Problems Relating Oughts to Evidence.

2015
University of Oxford, Etiology of Belief Workshop, Etiology and Defeat.

2015
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Stuart University, How to Endorse an Evidence Requirement, a Coherence Requirement, and the Possibility of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.

2015
Macquarie University, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments 

and A Virtue of Virtue Epistemology.

2014
University of Melbourne, On Doxastic Justification’s Supposed Basing Requirement.

2014
University of Canterbury, Etiology and Defeat.

2014
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Justification and Composite Normative Concepts.

2014
The Australian National University, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Justification and Composite Normative Concepts.

2013
University of Auckland, On Propositional and Doxastic Justification.

2013
University of Edinburgh, On the Nature and Grounds of Justification.

2012
American Philosophical Association, Central Division, The Special Composition Question, Transitivity, and Ordinary Objects.

2012
University of Connecticut Humanities Institute, Conservatism, Dogmatism, and Liberalism in Epistemology.

2011
St. Louis University, Yet More Transmission Failure.

2011
University of Notre Dame, Epistemic Inconsistency and Skepticism About Intuition.