Jump to main content

Quicklinks

Publications



Monographs

  • Forthcoming Explaining Knowledge: An Abductivist Account. Oxford University Press

  • 2010 Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 278 pp. 

    Reviews: Analysis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Choice, Grazer philosophische Studien, Memory Studies, Mind, Philosophical Quarterly

  • 2008 The Metaphysics of Memory. Dordrecht: Springer, 191 pp.

    Reviews: European Journal of Philosophy, International Journal of Philosophical Studies

  • 2006 Reading Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 208 pp.

     

Edited Works

  • forthcoming Vaccine Hesitancy: Epistemology and Ethics. with Sorell, Tom. New York: Routledge. Open access.
  • forthcoming Kant on Epistemic Autonomy and Authority. with Møller, Sofie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • forthcoming Global Perspectives on Kant. with Allais, Lucy & Lau, Chong-Fuk. Berlin: De Gruyter. Open access.
  • 2022 Kant and Contemporary Epistemology. with Benossi, Lisa & Ohlhorst, Jakob. Special issue of History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 25:1, 254 pp.
  • 2021 The Epistemology of Fake News. with Flowerree, Amy & Grundmann, Thomas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2019 Medical Knowledge in a Social World. with Holman, Bennett & Garbayo, Luciana. Synthese 196. Special issue.
  • 2017 Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. with Michaelian, Kourken. London: Routledge, 589 pp.
  • 2011 Routledge Companion to Epistemology. with Pritchard, Duncan. London: Routledge, 895 pp.
  • 2000 Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. with Dretske, Fred. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 600 pp.


Papers

Epistemology

  • forthcoming Vaccination and Russian Roulette. In S. Bernecker & T. Sorrell (eds.) Vaccine Hesitancy: Epistemology and Ethics. New York: Routledge.
  • 2025 On the Accuracy and Aptness of Suspension. with Rosa, Luis. Philosophical Studies. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02306-y
  • 2024 Evidence, Reasons, and Knowledge in the Reasons-First Program. with Silva, Paul. Philosophical Studies 181: 617-625.
  • 2024 Knowledge, Falsehood, and Defeat. In R. Borges & I. Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge (pp. 139-157). London: Routledge.
  • 2023 Justified Evidence Resistance. Acta Analytica 39: 693-704.
  • 2023 Greco's Explanatory Salience Contextualism Revisited. Synthese 201:80. DOI: doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04067-9
  • 2022 Knowledge from Falsehood and Truth-Closeness. Philosophia 50: 1623-1638.
  • 2021 An Epistemic Defense of News Abstinence. In S. Bernecker, A. Flowerree & T. Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News (pp. 286-309). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2020 Against Global Method Safety. Synthese 197: 5101-5116
  • 2016 Extended Minds in Vats. In S.C. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat (pp. 54-72). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 2015 Bayesian Epistemology. In R. Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (pp. 88-89). 3rd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • 2015 On the Metaphysics of Knowledge. In M. Gabriel, W. Hogrebe, & A. Speer (eds.), The New Desire for Metaphysics (pp. 161-180). Berlin: de Gruyter.
  • 2015 Die identifikationistische Lösung des Gettier Problems. In D. Koppelberg & S. Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie - wie und wozu? (pp. 189-214). Münster: Mentis.
  • 2014 How to Understand the Extended Mind. Philosophical Issues 24: 1-23.
  • 2014 Der Wert des Wissens. In N. Kompa & S. Schmoranzer (eds.), Grundkurs Erkenntnistheorie (pp. 109-119). Paderborn: Mentis.
  • 2013 Triangular Externalism. In E. Lepore & K. Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson (pp. 443-455). Oxford: Blackwell.
  • 2013 Warum das Gettier-Problem kein Scheinproblem ist. In G. Ernst & L. Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem: Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren (pp. 29-48). Paderborn: Mentis.
  • 2012 Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure. Acta Analytica 27: 367-381.
  • 2011 Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92: 127-152.
  • 2009 Die Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung und der direkte Realismus. In R. Schantz (ed.), Aktuelle Probleme der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung (pp. 155-181). Frankfurt/M.: Ontos.
  • 2009 Weshalb Wissen keinen spezifischen Wert hat. In G. Schönrich (ed.), Wissen und Werte (pp. 73-94). Paderborn: Mentis.
  • 2008 Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 164-172.
  • 2007 Wider den Empirismus bezüglich Farbbegriffen. In J. Steinbrenner & S. Glasauer (eds.), Farben (pp. 248-273). Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
  • 2006 Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130: 81-104.
  • 2004 Rule-Following Made Easy. In W. Löffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief (pp. 63-69). Vienna: öbv-hpt.
  • 2003 Psychophysische Gesetze und Supervenienz. Philosophia Naturalis 40: 207-225.
  • 2003 Skeptizismus, Naturalismus und Quine. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 110: 46-58.
  • 1997 Radikale Interpretation und Skeptizismus. In W.R. Köhler (ed.), Davidsons Philosophie des Mentalen (pp. 53-65). Paderborn: Schöningh.
  • 1994 Review of Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts (OUP 1991). Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 48: 318-321.
  • 1989 Review of Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (OUP 1986). Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 43: 399-403.

Memory

  • forthcoming The Ethics of Remembering and Forgetting. Forthcoming in A. Sant’Anna & C. Craver (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • 2026 Preservationism in Memory. with Silva, Paul. Ratio 39: 10-16.
  • 2025 Remembering ‘Memory.’ Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso 28: 4-16. DOI: 10.22370/rhv2025iss28.4860
  • 2024 Dreaming, Imagining, and Remembering. In D. Gregory & K. Michaelian (eds.), Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues (pp. 241-259). Berlin: Springer.
  • 2022 An Explanationist Model of (False) Memory. In A. Sant’Anna, C. McCarroll, & K. Michaelian (eds.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory (pp. 109-126). London: Routledge.
  • 2020 Review of Jordi Fernández, Memory: A Self-Referential Account (OUP 2019). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2020.03.19.
  • 2020 The Ethics of Remembering and Forgetting. Chinese Social Sciences Today Vol. 1996 (08/25/2020). www.cssn.cn/kxk/kxyrw/202008/t20200825_5173772.shtml
  • 2019 Replies to Review Symposium on the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. with Michaelian, Kourken. Memory Studies 12: 746-750
  • 2019 Knowledge from Forgetting. with Grundmann, Thomas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 98: 525-540.
  • 2018 On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus & D. Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory (pp. 241-258). London: Routledge.
  • 2017 A Causal Theory of Mnemonic Confabulation. Frontiers in Psychology 8: 1207: 1-14.
  • 2017 Memory and Truth. In S. Bernecker & K. Michaelian (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (pp. 51-62). London: Routledge.
  • 2015 Visual Memory and the Bounds of Authenticity. In D. Moyal-Sharrock, V. Munz & A. Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action (pp. 445-463). Berlin: de Gruyter.
  • 2015 Memory in Analytic Philosophy. In D. Nikulin (ed.), Memory: A History (pp. 298-315). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • 2011 Memory Knowledge. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology (pp. 326-334). London: Routledge. 

    Longer version reprinted 2011 in Protosociology,  www.protosociology.de/download/bernecker-memory.pdf

  • 2011 Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg. Philosophical Studies 153: 109-121.
  • 2011 Precis of Memory: A Philosophical Study. Philosophical Studies 153: 61-64.
  • 2010 Memory. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. revised Jan. 2015
  • 2007 Remembering without Knowing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85: 137-156
  • 2004 Memory and Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 605-632.
  • 2001 Russell on Mnemic Causation. Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 5: 149-185.

  • 2001 Impliziert Erinnerung Wissen? In T. Grundmann (ed.), Erkenntnistheorie (pp. 145-164). Paderborn: Mentis.

    Abbreviated reprint in A. Beckermann & C. Nimtz (eds.) Argument und Analyse, Paderborn: Mentis, 2002, pp. 142-158.

Kant & German Idealism

  • forthcoming Recursion and the Problem of Relevant Description in Epistemic Maxims. In S. Bernecker & S. Møller (eds.), Kant on Epistemic Autonomy and Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • 2022 A Kantian Perspective on Robot Ethics. with Benossi, Lisa. In D. Schönecker & H. Kim (eds), Kant and Artificial Intelligence (pp. 147-168). Berlin: de Gruyter.

  • Der indexikalische Fehlschluss in McTaggarts Beweis der Irrealität der Zeit. In V. Waibel (ed.), Raum und Zeit. Hamburg: Meiner.

  • 2018 Reinholds linguistischer Schematismus. In V.L. Waibel, M. Ruffing & D. Wagner (eds.), Proceedings of 12. International Kant Congress: Nature and Freedom, Vol. V (pp. 3369-3377). Berlin: de Gruyter.

  • 2012 Kant on Spatial Orientation. European Journal of Philosophy 20: 519-533.

  • 2012 Reinholds Erkenntnistheorie des Dissens. In V. Stolz, M. Bondeli and M. Heinz (eds.), Wille, Willkür, Freiheit: Reinholds Freiheitskonzeption im Kontext der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts (pp. 453-469). Berlin: de Gruyter.

  • 2010 Reinhold's Road to Fichte: The Elementary-Philosophy of 1795/96. In G. di Giovanni (ed.), Karl Leonhard Reinhold and the Enlightenment (pp. 221-240). Dordrecht: Springer.

  • 2009 Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten lesen. Information Philosophie 2009, vol. 2, pp. 50-58.

  • 2006 Kant zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis. Kant-Studien 97: 163-183.

  • 2006 Review of Dieter Freundlieb, Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy (Ashgate 2003). Philosophical Review 115: 115-117.

  • 1992 English translation of Dieter Henrich’s “The French Revolution and Classical German Philosophy.” with Wayne Martin & Hans Sluga. Dieter Henrich, Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World (pp. 85-99). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Self-Knowledge

  • 2011 Representationalism, First-Person Authority and Second-Order Knowledge. In A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge (pp. 33-52). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • 2009 Self-Knowledge and the Bounds of Authenticity. Erkenntnis 71: 107-21.

    Portuguese translation in Sképsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 9 (2016): 105-125.

  • 2009 Externalism. In M. Binder, N. Hirokawa & U. Windhorst (eds.), Encyclopedia of Neuroscience (pp. 1506-1508). Berlin: Springer.

  • 2005 Wissen zweiter Ordnung und Zombies. In A. Newen & G. Vosgerau (eds.), Den eigenen Geist kennen (pp. 119-134). Paderborn: Mentis.

  • 2004 Believing that you Know and Knowing that you Believe. In R. Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge (pp. 369-376). Berlin: de Gruyter.

  • 2000 Knowing the World by Knowing One’s Mind. Synthese 123: 1-34.

  • 1998 Self-Knowledge and Closure. In P. Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge (pp. 333-349). Stanford: CSLI Publications.

  • 1997 Die Grenzen des Selbstwissens. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 51: 216-230.

  • 1996 Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge. Noûs 30: 262-275. 

    Reprint in S. Bernecker & F. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 499-511.

  • 1996 Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism. Inquiry 39: 121-139.