Vorträge
2023
American Philosophical Association: Pacific Division. Symposium on my book: Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge, Symposium Panelists Include: Ram Neta, Sara Aronowitz, Clayton Littlejohn.
2023
American Philosophical Association: Central Division, Skepticism and the Structure of Factive States.
2023
Temple University, Degrees of Awareness.
2023
University of Hamburg, Degrees of Awareness.
2023
University of Luxembourg, Degrees of Awareness.
2023
Technical University of Dortmund, Degrees of Awareness.
2022
University of Glasgow, The Structure of Factive States.
2022
Humboldt University, Berlin, Belief-Suspension Compatibilism.
2022
University of Oxford, Oriel College, Belief-Suspension Compatibilism.
2022
Temple University, Belief-Suspension Compatibilism.
2022
Goethe University (Frankfurt am Main), The Normativity of Statistical Evidence.
2022
UNC Chapel Hill, Normativity Workshop, The Normativity of Statistical Evidence.
2022
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Comments on Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First.
2022
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Comments on Eric García’s “Belief Content and Rationality: Why Racist Beliefs Are Not Rational”.
2021
University of Edinburgh (TBD due to pandemic), Contemporary Kantian Epistemology.
2020
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, An Epistemic Paradox: Awareness 6 = Knowledge.
2020
University of Glasgow, A Lite Epistemic Paradox.
2020
Ruhr University Bochum, Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge
2020
University of Edinburgh (TBD due to pandemic), Contemporary Kantian Epistemology.
2020
University of Warwick (TBD due to pandemic), On Knowledge and Belief.
2020
Technische Universität Dortmund (TBD due to pandemic), On Possessing Reasons.
2019
Return of the Kantians Conference, University of Cologne, Kantian Modal Epistemology.
2019
Goethe Universität Frankfurt, In Defense of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge.
2019
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, New Prospects for Skepticism: Beliefless Knowing.
2018
Swarthmore College, Belief, Credence, Mistuned Knowledge.
2018
The Society for Exact Philosophy, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.
2017
Washington University of Saint Louis, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.
2017
University of Cologne, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.
2017
University of Delaware, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.
2017
University of Connecticut, Social Epistemology Workshop, A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.
2017
Syracuse University, The Creighton Club: The New York State Philosophical Association, Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief
2017
College of William and Mary, A Conceptual Analysis of Glory.
2017
Swarthmore College, Beliefless Knowing.
2017
St. Joseph’s University, Beliefless Knowing.
2017
University of Notre Dame, Formal Epistemology Reading Group, Mistuned Knowledge (w/ Matt Lee).
2016
La Trobe University, Problems for Evidential Enkrasia are No Problem for Normative Enkrasia.
2016
Monash University, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Some Problems Relating Oughts to Evidence.
2015
University of Oxford, Etiology of Belief Workshop, Etiology and Defeat.
2015
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Stuart University, How to Endorse an Evidence Requirement, a Coherence Requirement, and the Possibility of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.
2015
Macquarie University, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments
and A Virtue of Virtue Epistemology.
2014
University of Melbourne, On Doxastic Justification’s Supposed Basing Requirement.
2014
University of Canterbury, Etiology and Defeat.
2014
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Justification and Composite Normative Concepts.
2014
The Australian National University, Australasian Association of Philosophy, Justification and Composite Normative Concepts.
2013
University of Auckland, On Propositional and Doxastic Justification.
2013
University of Edinburgh, On the Nature and Grounds of Justification.
2012
American Philosophical Association, Central Division, The Special Composition Question, Transitivity, and Ordinary Objects.
2012
University of Connecticut Humanities Institute, Conservatism, Dogmatism, and Liberalism in Epistemology.
2011
St. Louis University, Yet More Transmission Failure.
2011
University of Notre Dame, Epistemic Inconsistency and Skepticism About Intuition.