Awareness by Degree, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (w/ Wes Siscoe), forthcoming
Ignorance and Awareness, Nous. (w/ Wes Siscoe), 2024
Merely Statistical Evidence: When and Why It Justifies Belief, Philosophical Studies, 2023
Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defence, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2023
Evidence, Reasons, and Knowledge in the Reasons-First Program, Philosophical Studies, 2023
Basic Knowledge and the Normativity of Knowledge: the Awareness-First Solution, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2022
Can Worsnip’s Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Apparent Evidence?, Inquiry, 2022
Possessing Reasons: Why the Awareness-First Approach is Better Than the Knowledge-First Approach, Synthese, 2021
Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology, Episteme, 2021
Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology, Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, Routledge, 2020
A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content, Synthese, 2020
Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief, Episteme, 2019
Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in The Theory of Justification, Episteme, 2017
How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2017
Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification,” forthcoming, Inquiry, 2017
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2016
Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?, Journal of Philosophical Research, (w/ M.P. Lynch), 2016
On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs, Erkenntnis, 2015
Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2014
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2013
Ordinary Objects and Series-Style Answers to the Special Composition Question, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013
Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition, Philosophical Studies, 2013
Bücher
On Believing and Being Convinced, Cambridge University Press, 2024
Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 2023
Pacific APA Symposium, Book Summary, 2023
Propositional and Doxastic Justification (edited volume), Routledge. Co-editor: Luis R.G. Oliveira, 2022
Vorträge
2023 American Philosophical Association: Pacific Division. Symposium on my book: Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge, Symposium Panelists Include: Ram Neta, Sara Aronowitz, Clayton Littlejohn.
2023 American Philosophical Association: Central Division, Skepticism and the Structure of Factive States.
2023 Temple University, Degrees of Awareness (secondary author: Wes Siscoe).
2023 University of Hamburg, Degrees of Awareness (secondary author: Wes Siscoe).
2023 University of Luxembourg, Degrees of Awareness (secondary author: Wes Siscoe).
2023 Technical University of Dortmund, Degrees of Awareness (secondary author: Wes Siscoe).
2022 University of Glasgow, The Structure of Factive States.
2022 Goethe University (Frankfurt am Main), The Normativity of Statistical Evidence.
2022 UNC Chapel Hill, Normativity Workshop, The Normativity of Statistical Evidence.
2022 American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Comments on Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First.
2022 American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Comments on Eric García’s “Belief Content and Rationality: Why Racist Beliefs Are Not Rational”.
2021 University of Edinburgh (TBD due to pandemic), Contemporary Kantian Epistemology.
2021 American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, An Epistemic Paradox: Awareness 6 = Knowledge.
2021 University of Glasgow, A Lite Epistemic Paradox.
2021 Ruhr University Bochum, Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge