Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief, Episteme, 2019
Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in The Theory of Justification, Episteme, 2017
How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2017
Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification,” forthcoming, Inquiry, 2017
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2016
Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?, Journal of Philosophical Research, (w/ M.P. Lynch), 2016
On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs, Erkenntnis, 2015
Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2014
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2013
Ordinary Objects and Series-Style Answers to the Special Composition Question, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013
Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition, Philosophical Studies, 2013
Bevorstehende Veröffentlichungen
Debunking Objective Consequentialism: the Challange of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology, Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, Michael Klenk (ed.)
Mistuned Knowledge and the Prospects of a Lockean Unification of Epistemology, Episteme
Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification (with Luis R.G. Oliveira), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy Evidence, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.)
A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content, Synthese.