

Philosophisches Seminar  
der Universität zu Köln

## **Vortrag**

von

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**» Articulating Invariantism.  
Revisiting the Counterfactual Independence  
Account of Scientific Objectivity «**

**Abstract:**

Invariantism defines scientific objectivity via the notion of invariance. I will present a version of invariantism, according to which the key notion of invariance is spelled out more precisely as a specific sort of counterfactual independence. This invariantist view – the counterfactual independence account of objectivity – needs to be articulated in a more nuanced manner. To do so, I will first explore under which conditions this version of invariantism is applicable to two different concepts of objectivity: epistemic and structural objectivity. In a second step, I will analyze what the epistemic import of (different concepts of) objectivity is, what objectivity contributes to generating scientific knowledge, if one adopts the sort of invariantism I propose.

**am Mittwoch, 19. Juni 2024,**

**um 17.45 Uhr in HS XI b**

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